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Abstract
Many industries exhibit the phenomenon of joint marketing efforts:
each firm sells not only its own goods but also goods of its various
rivals. In effect, these "temporary joint ventures" involve sharing of
the marketing duties under some pre-arranged compensation scheme. This
paper investigates the phenomenon of such joint marketing by non-
cooperative rivals. The results indicate that such arrangements lead to
prices above the competitive level, perhaps approaching the collusive
level, even though the rivals continue to act non- cooperatively
.

I. INTRODUCTION
Recent research into oligopolistic markets has emphasized the
importance of behavioral rules, often referred to as facilitating
practices. These behavior patterns, whether formal or informally
structured, can be shown to have very real (and often anti-competitive)
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results. This paper will consider a similar phenomenon, the practice
of interfirm marketing arrangements.
A common example of this type of behavior exists in the operation
of modern residential real estate markets. Buyers and sellers of
residential real estate usually arrange for intermediaries to aid them
in their transactions. These intermediaries, real estate agents, pro-
vide the consumer with expertise and advice, in addition to serving as
a collection house for market information. The fact that the buyer
and seller usually have different real estate agents opens up a fasci-
nating collection of agency problems. This paper will consider one
such problem: there may exist some degree of inter-agent cooperation
in marketing.
Most observers of the residential real estate market would agree
that the growth of the Multiple Listing Service, known as the MLS, is
the most significant development in the industry in this century. The
MLS represents a procedure whereby individual agents, competitors on
listings of houses as well in acquiring buyers, jointly market each
other's houses. Homeowners listing their houses with brokers that
belong to the MLS are assured that the exposure level will be much
higher than if just one agent listed the house. Likewise, buyers no
longer need to visit numerous brokers' offices to search the market;
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each MLS agent can show the buyer all potentially attractive houses.
In the United States, over 90 percent of all homes sold through
brokers are handled via MLS.
The standard thinking on MLS is that it represents an unambiguous
"good" to society. The National Association of Realtors argues that
an MLS is an information service used to expedite brokerage. Cer-
tainly, information is improved and consumer search costs lowered.
However, the effect on pricing is not as easily discerned. In fact,
early industry promotions of MLS systems make a point of emphasizing
not only the marketing aspects of an MLS, but also the possibility
that the MLS could be used as a vehicle to raise commissions (FTC,
1983). The continued monitoring by antitrust authorities, as well as
the actual filing of antitrust suits reflects the widely shared
feeling that a MLS may act as some form of anti-competitive trade
association. Commenting on the observed uniformity of commissions,
Zumpano and Hooks (1988) note that "The recent FTC report, as did
earlier studies, attributes such pricing behavior to the cooperative
and interdependent marketing arrangements provided by local multiple
listing services" (page 13).
The economic literature on the effect of an MLS on a residential
real estate market has not been conclusive. Yinger (1981) and Wu and
Colwell (1986) present models that consider in some detail the process
of broker-buyer-seller links. These models are both search/matching
models with uncertainty. Yinger concludes that, absent any market
power effects, an MLS will lead to a decline in commission fees. This
follows from the fact that search costs drop and this is, in effect,
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passed on. Wu and Colwell, using a more extensive approach to modeling
the market, find more ambiguous results. They are unable to make hard
predictions as to the final effect of an MLS on equilibrium commis-
sions.
This paper will construct a model that demonstrates supercorapeti-
tive prices by rivals acting noncooperatively . In order to get to the
heart of the matter of commissions, the buyer-seller matching problem
will be suppressed. We will, instead, use a general form for market
transactions, one that incorporates the findings of the search/match
literature. Increases in marketing effort will lead to a reduction in
the expected time needed to find a suitable match. Our methodology
will be to explicitly consider commissions in such a model.
The model will consider a two-stage game wherein prices are set in
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the first period and marketing effort occurs in the second period.
In an earlier insightful work, Bernhein and Whinston (1985) demon-
strate how firms may find it beneficial to deal with a common agent in
handling industry-wide marketing. In their model, firms effectively
"sell" their product to a single, common agent that then sells to the
customer. They impose "competition" on this "monopolistic" agent by
forcing zero profit rules. The result is an equilibrium where the
marketing agent chosen will pay individual firms the cooperative value
for the product. Thus the firms set value at the joint maximum. This
can be thought of as a variation of the vertical integration litera-
ture. The firms set up one more stage in the production process and
let this "pure marketer" deal with the customers. An equilibrium then
arises wherein each firm sells the product at a quantity-price pair
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equalling the joint profit ("monopoly") maximum and the buyer (the
"competitive" retailer) pays this monopoly price for the product and
passes it on to final purchasers.
In the present work, the individual firms do not set up a unique
(but competitive) marketer. Rather, they contract with each other to
undertake joint marketing efforts. The paper is organized as follows.
The next section will present an examination of the residential real
estate market in general terms, before and after the introduction of
the MLS. Here, it will be demonstrated that the mirror image of the
usual Bertrand-Nash outcome holds: price is bid ^ip_ (possibly as far
as the monopoly level) rather than down to cost. The following section
will offer an example with slightly differentiated products (houses).
Here, as in the standard Bertrand model, the differentiation tends to
dampen the degree of price competition. However, it is still the case
that the MLS unambiguously leads to higher commissions charged for
brokerage services. This section is followed by a discussion of the
membership decision. Finally, the conclusion will offer some caveats
and suggestions for future research.
II. THE MODEL
This section will attempt to describe an urban residential real
estate market. The market is comprised of numerous buyers and sellers
whose transactions are facilitated by intermediaries: real estate
agents
.
In order to provide the clearest view of the effects of the MLS
on real estate agent behavior, we will use a very simple model. In
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their role as intermediaries, real estate brokers can be thought of as
one stage in the vertical production process. Homeowners, or housing
contractors, are the "manufacturers" and brokers are the "retailers"
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in the language of the traditional vertical integration literature.
The brokerage process involves the "purchase" of the house by the
agent; the agent subsequently sets the commission and the house is
marketed. That is, the broker buys the inputs (houses) from upstream
producers (the homeowners). We assume that the owner's asking price
is determined by a competitive process, allowing us to concentrate on
the formation of optimal brokerage fees (commissions).
In specifying the supply curve for houses, we are immediately
faced with the complication that houses are, of course, differentiated.
While prices may be correlated with square footage, for example, it is
easy to imagine several houses with identical size but widely differ-
ing prices. To avoid this complication, we concentrate on a single
class of house, the ubiquitous $100,000 house. We assume that the
supply of such class of houses is perfectly elastic at that price. As
such the sellers asking price, P„ , can be treated as parametric to the
problem: P„ is fixed at P„. Additionally, we make a specific assump-
tion about the form of the broker's commission. The choices are "flat
fee" versus "percentage of sale." In order to reflect the institu-
tional details of a typical real estate market, the latter method is
used. However, it should be pointed out that this is not an unreason-
able assumption. The traditional principal agent literature has
demonstrated the advantages of such a compensation scheme in a
bilateral agency relationship (Harris and Raviv (1979)).
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These assumptions imply that the full price of a house, p., can be
written as:
*1 " (1+Pi >?H
where p. is the commission charge. The first part of this section
will consider the workings of such a housing market in the absence of
an MLS. This will provide us with a benchmark to use in comparison
with the results of the second part where an MLS is introduced.
A. The Market Without Multiple Listing Services
Consider a real estate market with many buyers and sellers of
houses. These houses are sold through intermediaries in a well estab-
lished brokerage market. The real estate agents A. (i=l, ..., N)
provide a service to sellers and buyers in providing information.
Each agent charges a fee for performing this service. This fee
(commission) is chosen to maximize the agent's profits given costs and
rival firm behavior.
The general form of demands can be written as follows: The number
of houses sold by agent i is
(1) q. = f(p
t
,pj
where p. is own price,
_p. is the vector of prices of all rival sellers
and f < 0, f
_> 0. This last restriction allows the various houses
to be substitutes.
As mentioned earlier, several authors have modeled the housing
sale transaction through search/matching methodologies. There, an
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increase in marketing effort leads to an increased probability of get-
ting a match between the buyer and the seller. However, the timing
issue is effectively ignored. Our approach will be similar, with
direct emphasis placed on the issue of the length of time it takes to
move the house. Each house is sold under uncertainty in the form of
an unknown date of sale. Specifically, each firm invests a certain
amount of marketing expenditures, m. , at time t=0. This expenditure
will lead to an expected sale date x according to the cumulative
distribution function H(t,m) corresponding to
t
J h( T ,ra)dT
where h(x>m) is the pdf indicating the probability that the house will
be sold at time x given expenditure m. This function is increasing in
m. That is, the expected "time on the market" is a decreasing function
of the amount of marketing effort devoted to the house in question.
The agent's cost is a function of the number of houses sold. We
assume that the cost function can be written as:
(2) C.(q.) = P q. + c.q. + m.q. + F.
l
n i H M i l^i i M i l
Included in the fixed cost terra are the overhead costs of operation
as well as acquisition costs: c.q. represents the cost of completing11
(closing) the sale, the same to agents of sellers as to agents of
buyers; m.q. refers to the cost of marketing each house, assumed11
constant; and P..q. represents the supply price of the housing stock
sold by agent i.
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Each agent must choose price to maximize discounted expected prof-
its on the sale. The equilibrium concept imposed will be a simple
noncooperative Nash game in prices. This Bertrand-Nash equilibrium
will be a set of strategies among the N agents where each firm's
optimal strategy is the behavior that maximizes expected firm profits.
Profits can be written as:
oo
(3) V. = / (p i-c i
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H )q.(p.,_D_
)h(t,m)e~ rt dt - m.q.Cp £_ ) - F.
where r is the common discount rate. Equation (3) is written to
reflect the fact that revenues, closing costs and housing stock, pur-
chase prices are not incurred until the (uncertain) time of sale.
Marketing costs, m.q.(), are up-front. In the absence of collusion,
each agent will choose a price which maximizes (3) given his rival's
behavior. Through standard procedures, one can derive the Bertrand
N
reaction functions and the non-cooperative equilibrium prices, p .
B. The Multiple Listing Service
The results of the above section indicate that Bertrand-Nash com-
petitors will find the non-cooperative price in a manner exactly the
same as traditional Bertrand models: simultaneous solution of the N
best response functions. In this section, the game will be changed
somewhat. The introduction of cooperative marketing, the MLS, implies
a change in the incentive structure faced by real estate agents: the
introduction of second stage (the marketing period) to the game. In
part A above, the agent chose price and marketed his house. N'ow the
agent must choose price with the knowledge that the total marketing
level devoted to the house will be dependent on this price.
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Essentially, an MLS offers the opportunity to greatly increase the
number of agents marketing any particular listing. The institutional
characteristics are important enough to warrant further explanation.
Suppose all assumptions from part A above follow. Once again, agent i
sells q. which is a function of own price and rivals' prices. If
agent i is a member of the MLS, then each house is now available to be
sold by any agent that is also a subscriber (member) of the organiza-
tion. That is, the marketing level is now a function of the many
agents' efforts. Let MeN be the set of agents j that market agent i's
house; each agent j can invest an amount of marketing effort, denoted
m., on agent i's house. To simplify we let m. = m. = m. This assumes
that the marketing effort is either nil or, if positive, equal to some
constant level independent of the identity of the symmetric real estate
agents. Think of it as follows: each agent picks a path toward sel-
ling the unit (house) and each path is assumed independent with iden-
tically distributed. In order to attract this marketing effort, agent
i must offer agent j some form of compensation for agent j's effort in
the q. transaction. As compensation, we assume the agent that "wins"
(i.e., the agent that finds the buyer) splits the commission evenly
with the listing agent. This 50-50 split is, indeed, the predominant
arrangement in the real estate industry.
Now the expected time on the market will be much different. Each
rival interested in marketing the house will invest m, giving that
agent an equal shot at finding the buyer first. This reduces the
probability that i will be the "winning" marketer but also compresses
the time until sale. Formally, if we let T represent the time of
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sale and let K represent the total number of agents showing the
house (the listing agent plus the K-l rivals), the probability that i
finds a buyer before one of the (K-l) rivals is written:
Prob(T
i
<T
K )
= h(T,m)(l-H(T,m)) K
"1
Likewise the probability that one of the (K-l) rivals will find a
buyer before the listing firm i can be written:
Prob(x <T.) = (K-l)h(T,m)(l-H(T,m))K
"1
K. i
Expected profits are now transformed into two parts: the expected
profits from an agent's own sales and those from sales of the agent's
houses by other members of the MLS.
00
(4) V
MLS
=
J (P i
-c.-P
H
)q.h(t,m)(l-H(t,m))K
"1
e"
rt:
dt - mq. - F
00
+
J j (p -c -P )q (K-l)h(t,m)(l-H(t,m)) K
" 1
e"
rt
d
where F > F now includes the non-zero membership fee into the MLS.
In this environment, the market has a decidedly different charac-
terization. Before, the individual agents simply announced prices,
marketed at level ra and the noncooperat ive solution held. In the
present case, the game is composed of two stages. In the first stage,
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each agent offers a package of houses to the MLS. These houses can
be sold by any agent (including agent i) for the announced corapensa-
t ion.
In the second stage, each agent in the MLS examines the listing of
possible houses and decides which houses to market. That is, each
-11-
agent chooses a subset of the total houses and expends effort m in
exposure of this house to potential buyers. After this stage is
completed, all variables, prices and exposure levels, are known and
the equilibrium is achieved.
Again using Bertrand-Nash as the equilibrium concept, consider the
firm's optimal behavior. In this two stage game, the proper way to
consider choices is to start from the second stage and work backwards.
From the appropriate stage 2 price node, marketing effort decisions
are made and the appropriate payoff is determined. Thus, the agents
are able to "see" how their price vectors will translate to marketing
responses in the second stage.
Consider the effort spent on any agents' housing stock. As in all
Bertrand games, an allocation rule must be invoked. In this case, the
allocation is not over quantities; rather it is the determination of
joint marketing expenditures. Let V refer to the discounted expected
profits to any rival firm j from selling firm i's houses. Then
00
(5) V - J j (p -c.-PH )q.h(t,m)(l-H(t,m)) K
" 1
e"
rt
dt - mq.
is the expected profits to rival j _if the rival chooses to market
agent i's houses.
To complete the model, we need to determine K* , the number of
rivals that will actually market agent i's house. Competition in
marketing will attract additional brokers until expected profit is
driven to zero. Defining K* as this breakeven level, we have:
oo
(6) V
r
=
J j (p.-c)q i h(t,m)(l-H(t,m))
K*" 1
e"
rt
dt - mq
._
=
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Since entry into an MLS entails positive fees (membership costs)
agents will become members of the MLS only if they receive benefits
(joint marketing) from this organization. That is, each member will
price so as to encourage cooperative marketing.
The result is the mirror image of the conventional Bertrand-Nash
game with differentiated products. In that game, the individual firm
i sees reduced profits if p, > p.. In the present game, agents are
not trying to lure customers, desirous of lower prices, but are after
marketers, desirous of more attractive compensation. Certainly,
agents still understand the quantity impact of any price change, up
or down. However, imagine the agents are at the Bertrand/Nash
equilibrium described in the previous section; now introduce the
joint marketing aspects of the MLS. The previous equilibrium price,
determined on the basis of demand and competition, will no longer be
optimal as there is a (unilateral) gain from joint marketing realized
when the agent attracts such help. That is, a new "marginal benefit"
to increasing price has been added to the incentive structure.
The fact that agents are willing to pay to belong to the MLS is
evidence that they will price so as to gain from the added exposure.
The competitive return generated in the non-MLS scenario will not
attract any exposure from other MLS agents. The Bertrand solution to
(4) and (5) is, in this general form, quite messy. It is clear that
prices in this MLS game will be higher than those where the joint
marketing impact of pricing decisions is not felt. In fact, given
sufficient conditions, the outcome could approach the monopoly, or
fully collusive price, analogous to the fact that some conditions,
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constant marginal costs and homogeneous products, cause the standard
Bertrand solution to degenerate to the competitive price. In order to
better demonstrate the equilibrium, the next section gives some form
to the probability functions as well as the demand curves.
III. AN EXAMPLE ECONOMY
In this section, we will impose some structure on the model in an
attempt to convey more of the intuition of the result. First, con-
sider the probability functions. Let u(m) be the marketing production
function, mapping the marketing effort m to exposure levels. We assume
the cumulative density function can be written:
-p(m)t
H(t,m) = 1 - e
which implies that the pdf is
-u(m)t
h(t,m) = M(m)e
and the expected date of sale, E(x) is then just l/u(m). For nota-
tional simplicity, we also assume closing costs are symmetric across
firms: c. = c. = c.
i J
Case 1: The No-MLS Case
Expected profit for firm i (equation (3)) can be written:
_
-(u(m)+r)t
V. = J (p.-c-P, )q . u(m)e dt - mq . - Fi q l h M M i
This reduces to
R.u(m)
<
7 ) v •
=
) nx - mq • - Fi u(m)+r M i
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where R. = (p.P-c)q.. For the remainder of this section, normalize
i
r i H ^1
Case 2: The MLS Case
Equation (4) is the relevant expected profit term. It is now
written (letting R. again refer to (p.-c)q.)
-(Ku(m)+r)t
V - J R.u(m)e dt - mq . - F
-(Ky(m)+r)t
+ J j R (K-l)ii(m)e dt
or
Note, in this case, the expected date of sale is now 1/Ku(m). Equa-
tion (8) can be further simplified to the specification
(9) V. = R6(K) - mq - F
where 6(K) = u(m)(K+l)/2(Ku(m)+r).
At this point, two observations are helpful. First, note that
6(1) = u(m)/(u(m)+r) . That is, (9) is equal to (7) in the case of no
rival joint marketing. Secondly, consider the impact of additional
marketing on expected profits. Note that 9 6/3K > only if r > u(m).
The intuition is that an individual agent will desire marketing help,
ceteris paribus, the higher is the agent's discount rate or the lower
the individual probability of selling the house (the less effective
is the individual marketing production function). For our purposes,
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we will consider only such cases where r > u(m). If r < u(m) then
8 6/3K is always nonpositive, implying additional marketers lower
expected profits to the listing agent. Clearly, no firm would pay
F > F to belong to the MLS in such an environment.
Equations (7) and (9) allow us to derive the Bertrand reaction
function without and with an MLS respectively. However, in order to
explicitly determine the equilibrium, one last bit of structure must
be imposed: we need some explicit functional form for buyer demands.
Consider the differentiated oligopoly proposed by Shubik. and
Levitan (1980). This model posits a simple quadratic utility function
in goods and has the added feature that the resulting demands are
linear. Both substitutes and complements are possible but we will
consider only the former case. This form of demand, allowing some
differentiation in products, is necessary to produce non-trivial
results. That is, there is no graphical depiction of the Bertrand
reaction functions in the case of homogeneous goods.
Using this quadratic form for utility, it is straightforward to
determine that demand for agent i's output is written:
(10) ,-!(.-, - T(p -± ?p„
12
where y > to denote that rivals' houses are substitutes. Given
this demand specification, we can determine the explicit form of the
reaction functions. The form will be, as indicated by the profit
functions (7) and (9), dependent upon the existence of the MLS.
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Case A: Bertrand Equilibrium Without An MLS
Recalling, expected profit is written
p.q. u(m)
V, = M-gr mq. - F
i u(m)+r n i
where the constant cost term c, symmetric across firms, has been
suppressed. There are N firms in this differentiated duopoly.
Consider a single player, firm 1, versus all his rivals:
N
- m(a - Pl - YPj +^ Pj + ^ I P )/N - F
Since, in any equilibrium, each identical agent will face the same
constraints and have the same incentives, we can model the (N-l) rivals
as a single player charging p~. That is the same as assuming all of
N
firm l's rivals are charging identical prices, p_, implying Z p. =
i *i J
N-l J
( „ )p n « Maximizing (11) with respect to p 1 allows us to determine
the form of the reaction function for firm 1 in the case of independ-
ent marketing:
i j. N-l, u(m) ,.. N-l.
„,„,., _
(a+p
o
Y
—'^iTF + n(1^—
>
RFl(Po)
~ ^
2il+y <ti.yHl2L. —ZU Y N Vm)+r
or
M ,s pn t v
a P Y N m(u(m) + r)(12) RF l(P() ) - Pl = N_ x + 2u(m)
2(1+Y—
)
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Through similar derivations, one could arrive at the reaction function
for the rivals, p n . In both cases, due to the substitutability of the
products, these reaction functions, depicted in Figure 1, are increas-
ing in rivals price. Solving the reaction functions generates the
following equilibrium price, quantity pair:
m(r+u(m))(l+Y
-^p) + av(«0
P* =
and
q* =
y(m)(2+y-^p)
(l+Y-^r)(ay(m) - m(r+u(m)))
N
Nu(m)(2+Y ^p)
This noncooperative equilibrium is, of course, the point E
n
in Figure 1.
Case B: Bertrand Equilibrium Under an MLS
Here, agents pay a fee to join the MLS and are offered joint mar-
keting efforts by fellow MLS agents. Expected profit (9) can now be
written:
V. = p.q.6(K) - mq. - F
Recalling that the number of co-marketers, K, will be determined by
the expected profits to rival agents j arising from marketing firm i's
houses, define K* = |k|V =0}. Now, from (5) we know V . By substi-
tuting in the demand equation (10) and setting V = 0, we can derive
the value of K which drives expected profit to the marginal co-broker
to zero:
-18-
— p. u(m)-mr
k*
--HU
—
U(m)m
which results in
= p.u(m)-m(r-p(m))
(13) 6(K*) X , .
p. u(.m;
Inserting (13) and (10) into (9), we can once again consider firm 1
against its various rivals, lumped under the name "firm" 0. Solving
for the appropriate p. given pn , we find a reaction function under the
existence of the MLS, RF (P Q ):
N-l
MA.
a+P T~
,
mr
(14) p. = =-=- +
N
It is straightforward to solve for the equilibrium, denoted as p*, q*
N-l
2mr(l+y -=-) + ay(m)
*
N
and
M(m)(2+Y -^)
(oy(m)-2mr)(l+Y ^p)
q*
Ny(m)(2+Y —i-)
This equilibrium is depicted by the intersection of RF (p ) and
RF
M (p Q ) in Figure 2.
Of crucial importance to this research is the comparison of the
reaction functions and equilibria under the two scenarios. Let
RF (p„) denote the reaction function of firm 1 when all agents are
independent and RF (p„) denote firm l's reaction function when all
agents belong to the MLS. All else being equal, we can then compare
-19-
these two best response functions. Comparing the optimal price under
a MLS to the one in a market without joint marketing efforts, we find
N-l
m+ A m(r-tf(m))(l+Y -=-)
(15) p. (MLS) - p.(No-MLS) + zr-
1 L
M(m)(2+Y-^p)
Scrutiny of the final term in (15) indicates that as long as r > u(m),
the price under MLS will be strictly greater than the price in a
market without MLS. However, we know that r > p(m) is the condition
necessary to make 8 6/3K > 0. Thus, if agents find it useful to join
the MLS, the new best response functions change and equilibrium price
rises. These new reaction functions are depicted along with the old
ones in Figure 2. At E , the MLS equilibrium, agents charge a higher
price than at E^, the original, independent broker equilibrium.
The purpose of this section has been to offer diagrammatic exposi-
tion of the ideas presented in Section II. Here, to avoid the un-
tractable nature of the general Bertrand price solution in the case
of substitutes, we have considered an explicit functional structure.
The results are the same: the possibility of outside firm aid in
sales effort, dependent on the,price offered, leads Nash-Bert rand
players away from the noncooperative price.
IV. THE MEMBERSHIP DECISION
Before closing, it is important to consider the decision by an
agent to join an MLS in the first place. Nearly all residential
housing markets are characterized by coexistence of MLS and non-MLS
real estate agents. The purpose of this section is to explicitly
-20-
consider this situation in terms of the model just presented. That
is, it is important to consider how such an equilibrium can arise.
Obviously, absent membership constraints, the only equilibrium
involves equalization of marginal profits.
Fortunately, the groundwork for such an analysis has been provided
by Deneckere and Davidson (1985) in their paper on coalition forma-
tion. While they dealt explicitly with mergers, it is possible to
consider the extension to the present case.
Let the total number of agents N be divided, arbitrarily, into two
sets, {i} and {N-I} and let the subscripts iel and j eN-I denote into
which group an agent falls. As a starting point, each agent acts non-
cooperatively without an MLS. Then, the reaction functions as in
Figure 1 are representative. RF (p ) denotes the reaction function of
those agents iel and RF
T
(p„) denotes the reaction function of the
13
group j eN-I . Now consider the introduction of an MLS and let all
agents jeN-I become members of the MLS. (Again, for the moment, let
me arbitrarily take agents i and leave them independent and take
agents j and put them in the MLS.) Now, the reaction functon of a
particular member of j, given the MLS, can be solved by holding the
price charged by the independent firms iel constant at p,,, and con-
sider the effects of an unrelated change by firm j, given all other
N-I— 1 firms in {N-I} will follow in equilibrium. This reaction func-
tion is shown by RF'(p~) in Figure 3. This is different than one
of the RFw (p~) in Figure 2 in that the RFw (p_) was calculated givenML) ML)
that all other firms will, in equilibrium, also respond with price
changes. Now, only a subset N-I of the total N will move similarly.
-21-
Signif icantly , several points are important. First, the
equilibrium in Figure 3 occurs at a price pair where those in the MLS
are charging more than those outside the MLS. Thus, while independent
agents can offer houses at a lower price, they also receive (possibly
significant) less marketing exposure.
Secondly, consider the profits involved in the membership deci-
sion. It is straightforward, although extremely tedious, to consider
profits to iel and jeN-I as the size of each group changes. What is
important is to consider the key points of this equilibrium. It is
possible to show that the profits to firms j eN-I are less than those
earned by the independent firms iel at the new equilibrium point, E.
The obvious question is, why would a firm ever join the MLS, given
that non-MLS firms earn higher profits? To answer this, let I, N-I
be the equilibrium configuration. That is, N-I represents the size of
the MLS such that gains to the M+l member would be less than the
membership fee. Per firm profits to members of the MLS are a decreas-
ing function of membership size. Thus, there is an upper bound on the
number of firms that will join the MLS. The equilibrium occurs at the
configuration I*, N-I*. Let M* denote the equilibrium MLS membership
size. Then, the equilibrium is characterized by it
.
> for all j eMLS
but v\ < tt . for iel and tt! represents the profit to MLS members when
j i J
membership size increases by one. Thus, for any configuration with
membership roles of size less than M* , unilateral gains from joining
the MLS are positive. Even though those remaining in the 1-1 set gain
more, it is still a dominant strategy on the part of any given agent
iel to break and enter the MLS if membership is less than M*.
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V. CONCLUSION
The above model offers the interesting conclusion that competitive
rivals will price above the noncooperative level. Bertrand players
actually compete with each other to attract joint marketing efforts.
This competition, brought on by the institution of the MLS, will force
firms to offer more attractive partnerships in the individual joint
ventures.
Thus, while standard noncooperative Nash games in price result in
price being driven down to costs, this analysis finds the opposite.
The intuition is clear. Any individual agent i recognizes that
marketing efforts by its rivals j on behalf of i's stable of houses
will be made in a second stage
—
after the announcement of the price
vector. Thus, the agent must quote a price which optimally attracts
rivals to help sell the agent's houses. The equilibrium price quoted
by i will be that price which maximizes the compensation available to
j from such interfirra representation.
These results offer evidence in the matter of a policy issue of
current concern. Many people have called for the removal of prohibi-
tions against letting the general public have access to the listings
on the MLS files. If the general public were permitted such access,
there would be a significant drop in the incentive to raise prices.
In the polar extreme, if all buyers had access to the MLS, an agent
would not need to offer a higher price to attract interfirm marketing
efforts. The positive "information" effect of the MLS would still
14
occur but the negative 'price' effect would disappear.
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This analysis has demonstrated, in a very simple framework, how
an MLS can result in price increases, a significant finding in itself.
However, it points to a further issue of concern. In order to more
clearly focus on commissions, the assumption of perfect elasticity of
supply allowed us to take the price of housing stock as parametric to
the model. In fact, if there is some elasticity of supply in housing
stock, the MLS may have an effect on the price of housing, distinct
from the commissions charged. Evidence on this issue comes from the
Wu and Colwell matching model. They find that the introduction of an
MLS will precipitate a rise in the equilibrium price of housing in the
market. The question of whether this result follows in the present
model is a topic under current investigation.
Of additional interest for future research is the question of how
the "split" is determined, as well as how the MLS charges for its ser-
vices. In the present paper, the MLS charges a fixed fee for mem-
bership. However, it is clear that some strategic importance must be
in this decision. For example, alternative rules on compensating
rival marketers, or two part tariff pricing of MLS membership could
have significant impact on the equilibrium.
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FOOTNOTES
The name "facilitating practice" has been used to describe a
variety of conduct patterns. Salop (1986) formalizes the idea as
referring to practices that allow information exchange and work to
alter the pay-offs from certain forms of behavior.
2
Among other sources, Salop (1986) discusses various practices,
such as meet or release contracts, most-favored-customer clauses (also
analyzed in Cooper (1986)). Holt and Scheffraan (1987) consider the
effects of different pricing rules.
3
This two-stage procedure, set the commission and then the market-
ing level, is not unique to residential real estate. For example,
travel agents market air traffic tickets simultaneously (and in com-
petition) with the various issuing airlines.
4
Of course, housing contractors could sell their own homes. How-
ever, we will not consider such vertical integration issues in the
present paper.
Readers in housing markets more active than Champaign-Urbana can
instead imagine the ubiquitous $200,000 house. The key is, of course,
to stay away from thin markets.
Again, remember that it is this brokerage market (not the housing
market) we now wish to examine in more detail.
Note that price is not considered directly in this distribution
of selling time; indirectly, price will enter through its effects on
marketing efforts.
o
The reader will note that an explanation of 50/50 as the equilib-
rium split is not offered; we merely impose this split as an assump-
tion. Possible reasons include such phenomena as focal point pricing
or the result of Nash bargaining between symmetric players.
9
That is, the agent offers the houses and the prices required to
complete the sale.
Actually, (K*-l) rivals are involved. K* is the total number
selling i's houses, including firm i itself.
This normalization saves on notational complexities and entails
no loss of generality since the supply price P.. is constant.
12
Demand curves of this form, where sales are a function of own
price and the difference between own price and average price, are
common in models of quadratic utility. Interestingly, Carlson and
MacAfee (1983) find similar demand forms in a model of search costs
and price dispersion.
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13
Note, these are not group reaction functions. They are the
reaction functions of any particular member of a group to an out-
sider's charge in price.
14
Industry members decry such openings of MLS files on the standard
grounds that outsiders would not be able to perform the complex duties
of professional brokers. It is true that some changes would be
necessary, but they would most likely be minimal. See, for example,
the FTC report, pages 124-125.
26-
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